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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
  
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Ramon Prestol Espinal (referred to by the parties as 
Prestol) petitions for review of the decision of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (―BIA‖) that it lacked jurisdiction over 
Prestol‘s motion to reconsider the BIA‘s denial of relief 
because Prestol had been removed from the United States.  
Prestol‘s petition requires us to decide whether the Attorney 
General‘s regulation barring aliens who have been removed 
from the United States from filing a motion to reconsider 
and/or reopen, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d), otherwise known as the 
post-departure bar, is inconsistent with the Illegal 
3 
 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (―IIRIRA‖), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A), (7)(A), which 
specifically grants an alien the right to file one motion to 
reconsider and one motion to reopen without any geographic 
limitation on that right.   
 
                                        I.
1
 
   
Prestol was born in the Dominican Republic but lived 
in the United States from 1982 until 2009.  In January 2009, 
the Department of Homeland Security (―DHS‖) charged 
Prestol with being removable under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (―INA‖) as an alien 
present in the United States without being admitted or 
paroled.  In February 2009, DHS also charged him pursuant to 
sections 212(a)(2)(A)(i) and (a)(2)(B) of the INA with being 
removable as an alien convicted of an offense relating to a 
controlled substance and an alien convicted of two or more 
offenses involving crimes of moral turpitude.  These charges 
of removability were based on Prestol‘s 2004 convictions for 
possession of a controlled substance and violating a protective 
order.    
 
In April 2009, Prestol admitted the factual allegations 
underlying his notice to appear and was found removable as 
charged.  However, Prestol applied for asylum, withholding 
of removal and Convention Against Torture (―CAT‖) 
protection alleging that because of his previous assistance to 
the Drug Enforcement Agency he would be targeted for 
violence by drug dealers if he returned to the Dominican 
Republic.  On June 23, 2009, the Immigration Judge (―IJ‖) 
denied Prestol‘s applications for relief.  On November 3, 
2009, the BIA affirmed the IJ and twenty-one days later, 
November 24, 2009, Prestol was removed from the United 
                                                 
1
 Neither the merits of Prestol‘s motion for 
reconsideration nor his underlying request for relief are 
before us.  A brief procedural outline will therefore 
suffice.   
 
4 
 
States to the Dominican Republic.  On December 3, 2009, 
Prestol filed a timely motion to reconsider with the BIA.  On 
January 19, 2010, the BIA denied the motion to reconsider 
based on what it deemed a lack of jurisdiction resulting from 
Prestol‘s removal from the United States.  Prestol petitions for 
review of this decision. 
 
   II.
2
 
 
We review the BIA‘s legal conclusions de novo.  Patel 
v. Att’y Gen., 599 F.3d 295, 297 (3d Cir. 2010).  Where an 
agency‘s regulation allegedly conflicts with the governing 
statute, we employ the analysis prescribed by Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
The focus of Chevron is aimed at determining and giving 
effect to Congress‘ ―unambiguously expressed intent.‖  Id. at 
843.  Under Chevron step one, ―we must first determine if the 
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue 
of law in the case, using traditional tools of statutory 
construction to determine whether Congress had an intention 
on the precise question at issue.‖  Lin-Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 
557 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal quotation 
and citation omitted).  If Congress‘ intent is clear, our inquiry 
is at an end as the agency is required to give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.  Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 842-43.  If the statute is ambiguous, we move to step 
two and determine if the agency‘s interpretation of the statute, 
as expressed in the regulation, is reasonable and entitled to 
deference.  Id.   
 
       III. 
 
                                         A. 
 
Before delving into the Chevron analysis, we briefly 
outline the relevant statutory and regulatory framework.  The 
                                                 
2
 We have jurisdiction to review questions of law with 
respect to a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a).   
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regulatory right to file a motion to reopen or reconsider with 
the BIA has existed since 1940.  5 Fed. Reg. 3502, 3504 
(Sept. 4, 1940) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 90.9-90.10 (1941)).  
In 1952, the Department of Justice (―DOJ‖) issued a 
regulation barring the BIA from reviewing such a motion 
filed by a person no longer present in the United States.  17 
Fed. Reg. 11469, 11475 (Dec. 19, 1952) (codified at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 6.2 (1953)).   
 
That same year, 1952, Congress passed the McCarran-
Walter Act, which established the structure of current 
immigration laws.  Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 242(c), 66 Stat. 163, 
210 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1952)).  In 1961, 
Congress amended the law to provide courts of appeals with 
jurisdiction to review final orders of deportation through a 
petition for review.  Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5(a), 75 Stat. 650, 
651 (1961) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1962)).  
However, the 1961 amendment contained a post-departure 
provision paralleling the regulatory post-departure bar on 
motions to reopen/reconsider.  Specifically, the 1961 
amendment provided:  ―An order of deportation or of 
exclusion shall not be reviewed by any court if the alien . . . 
has departed from the United States after issuance of the 
order.‖  Id.  The DOJ issued implementing regulations 
whereby it repromulgated the post-departure bar to motions to 
reopen/reconsider.  27 Fed. Reg. 96, 96-97 (Jan. 5, 1962) 
(codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1962)).  In April 1996, the DOJ 
issued a regulation limiting aliens to one motion to reopen and 
one motion to reconsider and providing 90 and 30 days 
respectively for the alien to file each motion.  61 Fed. Reg. 
18900, 18901-5 (Apr. 29, 1996) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 
(1997)).   
 
Shortly thereafter, Congress passed IIRIRA, which 
made several significant changes to immigration law.  Pub L. 
No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).  For the first 
time, Congress created a statutory right for the alien to file a 
motion to reconsider and a motion to reopen with the BIA 
(previously such a right existed only pursuant to regulation).  
IIRIRA § 304(a)(3) (currently codified at 8 U.S.C. § 
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1229a(c)(6), (7)).  Congress also codified in the statute some 
of the pre-existing regulatory limitations for such motions, 
including the substantive requirements for motions to reopen, 
the numeric limitation and time limits.  Id.  Notably, when 
Congress enacted IIRIRA in 1996, it did not codify or adopt 
the post-departure bar regulation.  See Dada v. Mukasey, 554 
U.S. 1, 14 (2008) (outlining the regulations IIRIRA codified). 
  
IIRIRA also repealed the post-departure bar to judicial 
review of petitions for review that Congress originally 
imposed in 1961.  IIRIRA § 306(b), 110 Stat. 3009-612 
(repealing 8 U.S.C. § 1105a).  Additionally, Congress adopted 
a 90-day period for the government to deport a person who 
has been ordered removed.  IIRIRA § 305(a)(3) (currently 
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)). 
 
In 1997, the DOJ promulgated regulations 
implementing IIRIRA.  Notwithstanding the fact that 
Congress had for the first time codified the right for an alien 
to file motions to reconsider and reopen with the BIA and 
eliminated the post-departure bar for judicial review, the DOJ 
repromulgated the post-departure bar for motions to 
reconsider/reopen filed with the BIA, the regulation at issue 
in this case.  62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10321, 10331 (Mar. 6, 
1997) (currently codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d)).  The post-
departure bar regulation currently provides: ―A motion to 
reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be made by or on 
behalf of a person who is the subject of exclusion, 
deportation, or removal proceedings subsequent to his or her 
departure from the United States. Any departure from the 
United States, including the deportation or removal of a 
person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or 
removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of a motion to 
reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a withdrawal 
of such motion.‖  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d). 
 
B. 
 
With that background before us, we move to the 
Chevron statutory analysis.  ―[T]he starting point for 
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interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself.‖  
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 
U.S. 102, 108 (1980).  The Supreme Court has instructed that 
―we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a 
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to 
its object and policy.‖  United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 
U.S. 113, 122 (1850).   
 
The motion to reconsider provision of IIRIRA provides 
that ―[t]he alien may file one motion to reconsider a decision 
that the alien is removable from the United States.‖  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(6)(A).  Similarly, § 1229a(c)(7)(A) provides that 
―[a]n alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings.‖  It 
follows from the plain language of this statute that from the 
date of the final order of removal, the alien has 30 days to 
exercise his or her right to seek reconsideration and 90 days to 
seek reopening.  Id. § 1229a(c)(6)(B), (7)(C)(i).  The INA 
defines ―alien‖ broadly as ―any person not a citizen or 
national of the United States.‖  INA § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(3).  To repeat, the plain text of the statute provides 
each alien with the right to file one motion to reopen and one 
motion to reconsider, provides time periods during which an 
alien is entitled to do so, and makes no exception for aliens 
who are no longer in this country.   
 
Based on this plain language, the Fourth, Sixth, and 
Ninth Circuits have squarely held under Chevron that the 
post-departure bar conflicts with the statutory right to file a 
motion to reopen and/or reconsider.
3
  The Fourth Circuit held 
that the regulatory post-departure bar is invalid because the 
statute ―unambiguously provides an alien with the right to file 
one motion to reopen, regardless of whether he is within or 
                                                 
3
 Although some of the cases discussed herein deal 
with motions to reopen and this case deals with a motion 
to reconsider, the analysis for each is the same and the 
cases are therefore instructive.  For that reason, and 
because the post-departure bar to motions to reopen and 
reconsider is contained in a single regulation, if it is 
invalid it is invalid with respect to both kinds of motions.   
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without the country.  This is so because, in providing that ‗an 
alien may file,‘ the statute does not distinguish between those 
aliens abroad and those within the country—both fall within 
the class denominated by the words ‗an alien.‘‖  William v. 
Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 332 (4th Cir. 2007).   
 
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that ―no statute gives 
the [BIA] purchase for disclaiming jurisdiction to entertain a 
motion to reopen filed by aliens who have left the country.  
The most relevant statute, [IIRIRA], offers nothing to support 
such an interpretation of the regulation.  ‗An alien,‘ it says, 
‗may file one motion to reopen proceedings under this section 
. . . .‘  This is an empowering, not a divesting, provision, as it 
grants the Board authority to entertain a motion to reopen.‖  
Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d 234, 237-38 (6th Cir. 2011).   
 
Consistent with its two sister courts, the Ninth Circuit 
has held that the ―clear intent‖ of Congress was to provide 
aliens with the right to file a motion to reopen and/or 
reconsider and that the ―physical removal of [an alien] by the 
United States does not preclude the [alien] from pursuing‖ 
that motion.  Reyes-Torres v. Holder, --- F.3d ----, 2011 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 7062, at *8 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 2011) (quoting Coyt 
v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 2010)).  And over the 
contrary view of his colleagues, a dissenting judge from the 
Tenth Circuit reasoned that IIRIRA ―unambiguously 
guarantee[s] every alien the right to file one motion to 
reconsider removability and one motion to reopen removal 
proceedings, regardless of whether the alien has departed 
from the United States.‖  Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 
1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2009) (Lucero, J., dissenting).  We 
agree with these cases and adopt their analyses.
  
 
Moreover, two other circuits, including the Seventh 
Circuit and, in part, the Sixth Circuit, have invalidated the 
post-departure bar based on the Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 130 S. Ct. 584, 
590 (2009).  See Pruidze, 632 F.3d at 237-40 (invalidating the 
regulation based on both Chevron and Union Pacific); Marin-
Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591, 594-95 (7th Cir. 2010) 
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(invalidating the regulation solely on Union Pacific).  In 
Union Pacific, the Supreme Court held that an administrative 
agency cannot rely on an agency-created procedural rule to 
disclaim jurisdiction—Congress alone controls the agency‘s 
jurisdiction.  Therefore, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits 
reasoned that the BIA lacked authority to disclaim jurisdiction 
over the motions.
 4 
   
 
The Second Circuit‘s analysis in Luna v. Holder, 637 
F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2011), provides additional reinforcement for 
the view that the post-departure bar cannot be sustained.  In 
that case, the court addressed whether the 30-day filing 
deadline for petitions for review of BIA decisions violated the 
Suspension Clause and the alien‘s right to habeas corpus.  In 
holding that the Suspension Clause was not violated, the court 
held that the statutory motion to reopen process provides an 
adequate and effective substitute for habeas so long as the 
process ―cannot be unilaterally terminated by the 
Government‖ pursuant to the BIA‘s post-departure bar.  Id. at 
87.  Although the Second Circuit ―decline[d] to decide the 
validity of the departure bar regulation . . . in every possible 
context,‖ the court commented that the post-departure bar 
―has no roots in any statutory source‖ and that ―the BIA must 
consider an alien‘s motion to reopen even if the alien is no 
                                                 
4
 Although the Supreme Court did not discuss Chevron 
in Union Pacific, it is not clear to us that the Chevron 
question and jurisdictional question are entirely distinct.  
See Pruidze, 632 F.3d at 237 (―There is some question 
whether Chevron applies to disputes about the scope of an 
agency‘s jurisdiction.‖).   In the context of this case, both 
inquiries center on whether the agency has the authority to 
enact a rule that prevents it from hearing motions to 
reopen/reconsider and therefore both inquiries center on 
Congress‘ intent.  Because we decide the case based on 
Chevron, we need not definitively resolve whether Union 
Pacific presents a distinct question.  That said, to the 
extent the Sixth and Seventh Circuits found the regulation 
invalid, they support our ultimate holding.     
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longer in the United States.‖  Id. at 102 (internal quotation 
omitted).    
 
Our holding that the plain text of the statute leaves no 
room for the post-departure bar also finds some support in the 
Supreme Court‘s decision in Dada, 554 U.S. 1.  There, the 
Court was asked to reconcile two provisions of IIRIRA: § 
1229a(c)(7) which provides that an alien has the right to file 
one motion to reopen within 90 days of the order of 
deportation and § 1229c(b)(2) which requires an alien who 
has been granted the right to voluntarily depart to do so within 
60 days.
5
  If the alien does not leave within the voluntary 
departure period, the alien forfeits his or her right to the full 
benefits of voluntary departure (in particular, removal of the 
10-year restriction on readmission).  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1229c(d)(1).  On the other hand, if the alien departs pursuant 
to the post-departure bar regulation, such departure would 
have the effect of withdrawing the motion to reopen.  See 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.2(d).  Significantly, the Court noted that ―[a] 
more expeditious solution to the untenable conflict between 
the voluntary departure scheme and the motion to reopen 
might be to permit an alien who has departed the United 
States to pursue a motion to reopen postdeparture.‖  Dada, 
554 U.S. at 22.  However, because the post-departure 
regulation was not challenged in that case (as it is here) the 
Court declined to consider the regulation.  Id.  
 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court was required to 
decide ―whether Congress intended the statutory right to 
reopen to be qualified by the voluntary departure process.‖  
Id. at 5.  The government argued that by requesting voluntary 
departure, the alien was knowingly surrendering the 
opportunity to seek reopening.  The Court rejected this 
argument and instead held that the appropriate way to 
reconcile the voluntary departure and motion to reopen 
                                                 
5
 The time limit for voluntary departure is extended to 
120 days if the alien concedes removability before or 
during removal proceedings.  8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(2)(A).  
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provisions ―is to allow an alien to withdraw the request for 
voluntary departure before expiration of the departure period‖ 
and file the motion to reopen.  Id. at 20.   
 
Although the holding of Dada does not directly 
implicate the issue presented here, the Court‘s repeated 
emphasis on the statutory right to file a motion to reopen, and 
the effort of the Court to avoid abrogating that right (even in 
the face of another statutory provision which conflicted), 
inform our analysis.  Specifically, the Supreme Court noted 
that IIRIRA ―transforms the motion to reopen from a 
regulatory procedure to a statutory form of relief available to 
the alien.‖  Id. at 14.  It also noted that the ―statutory text is 
plain insofar as it guarantees to each alien the right to file 
‗one motion to reopen proceedings under this section.‘‖  Id. at 
15 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)).  The Court echoed its 
prior admonition ―counseling long hesitation ‗before adopting 
a construction of [the statute] which would, with respect to an 
entire class of aliens, completely nullify a procedure so 
intrinsic a part of the legislative scheme.‘‖  Id. at 18-19 
(quoting Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 127-28 (1964)).
6
     
 
The Court concluded that it ―must be reluctant to 
assume‖ that the voluntary departure statute removed the 
motion to reopen safeguard for the distinct class of deportable 
aliens most favored by the same law (that is, those subject to 
voluntary departure) ―particularly  . . . when the plain text of 
the statute reveals no such limitation.‖  Id. at 18.  The Court 
did not see the limitation at issue in the plain text of the 
statute and refused to read one in, notwithstanding the 
competing statutory and regulatory provisions.  See also 
Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 834 (2010) (―The motion to 
reopen is an ‗important safeguard‘ intended ‗to ensure a 
proper and lawful disposition‘ of immigration proceedings.‖) 
(quoting Dada, 554 U.S. at 18).   
                                                 
6
 At argument, the government conceded that the 
Supreme Court‘s emphasis on the statutory right to reopen 
was, to say the least, significant.   
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In sum, the Dada opinion emphasizes the importance 
of the statutory right to file a motion to reopen based on the 
plain text of the statute.   
 
The government contends that nothing in the text of 
the statute explicitly precludes the agency from imposing the 
post-departure bar.  In other words, it argues that the statute is 
silent on this issue.  The government supports this argument 
by reliance on the Tenth Circuit decision in Rosillo-Puga, 580 
F.3d 1147, the only court of appeals decision explicitly 
upholding the validity of the post-departure bar.  That court 
held that ―the statute is simply silent on the issue of whether it 
meant to repeal the post-departure bars contained in the 
Attorney General‘s regulations.  We certainly cannot derive a 
clear meaning from the language about ‗an alien‘ or ‗the 
alien‘ having the opportunity to file ‗one‘ motion for 
reopening or reconsideration.‖  Id. at 1156-57.7 
 
However, as explained by the Fourth Circuit majority 
opinion in William, ―the government‘s view that Congress 
was silent as to the ability of aliens outside the United States 
to file motions to reopen is foreclosed by the text of the 
statute.  The statutory language does speak to the filing of 
motions to reopen by aliens outside the country; it does so 
because they are a subset of the group (i.e. ‗alien[s]‘) which it 
vests with the right to file these motions.‖  499 F.3d at 332.  
The same point is made by the dissenting Tenth Circuit judge 
in Rosillo-Puga: ―The language Congress chose is plain and 
                                                 
7
 The dissenting judge in the Fourth Circuit‘s 
William decision, 499 F.3d at 336 (Williams, C.J., 
dissenting) held a similar view: ―[The statute] does not 
explicitly prohibit or permit motions to reopen made 
after departure.  The provision simply does not speak 
to that question.  And it is hardly surprising that the 
provision does not distinguish between classes of 
aliens, for the provision‘s purpose is to limit the 
number of motions to reopen that an alien may file.‖ 
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unequivocal.  It draws no distinction between aliens who are 
in the country and aliens who have departed.  All aliens are 
treated alike under the terms of [the statute], and all aliens are 
guaranteed the right to file one motion to reconsider and one 
motion to reopen.‖  580 F.3d at 1162. (Lucero, J., 
dissenting).
8
   
 
The government manufactures an ambiguity from 
Congress‘ failure to specifically foreclose each exception that 
could possibly be conjured or imagined.  That approach 
would create an ―ambiguity‖ in almost all statutes, 
necessitating deference to nearly all agency determinations.  
Nothing in the Supreme Court‘s Chevron opinion suggests 
this result, which is inconsistent with traditional modes of 
statutory interpretation.  See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 
L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2715 (2009) (―the presence of some 
uncertainty does not expand Chevron deference to cover 
virtually any interpretation of [the statute]‖).   
 
We have rejected similar efforts to create ambiguity.  
For example, in our unanimous en banc decision in Lin-
                                                 
8
 We are not persuaded by the government‘s 
contention that the First Circuit‘s decision in Pena-
Muriel v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 438 (1st Cir. 2007), 
directly supports its position.  In Pena-Muriel, the 
court was addressing the validity of 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.23(b)(1), which bars motions to reopen with the 
immigration judge post-departure, not with the BIA.  
Moreover, the thrust of Pena-Muriel‘s argument was 
that IIRIRA signaled Congress‘ intent to withdraw the 
post-departure bar, rather than that the re-promulgated 
regulation conflicted with IIRIRA.  Id. at 441; see also 
Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 510 F.3d 350 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(denial of panel rehearing) (―[W]e did not decide 
whether 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) conflicts with 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7).‖).  To the extent that the 
decision does hold that Congress did not explicitly 
address the validity of the post-departure bar, it adds 
little to the Tenth Circuit‘s analysis in Rosillo-Puga.   
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Zheng, 557 F.3d at 157, we held that a provision of the INA 
that granted refugee status to persons forced to undergo 
sterilization or abortion was unambiguous and that the agency 
interpretation permitting spouses of such persons to seek 
refugee status was impermissible.  The statute was not 
ambiguous merely because it did not expressly preclude 
spouses from relief.  As we explained, a ―statute‘s silence on 
a given issue does not confer gap-filling power on an agency 
unless the question is in fact a gap–an ambiguity tied up with 
the provisions of the statute.‖  Id. at 156 (internal quotation 
omitted).   
 
We rejected a similar statutory argument in De Leon-
Ochoa v. Att’y Gen., 622 F.3d 341, 353 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Petitioners who sought temporary protected status under the 
INA contended that their parents‘ residency could satisfy the 
continuous residency requirements.  They argued that the 
statute was ambiguous because the ―statute does not explicitly 
permit or disallow it and therefore there is no ‗plain 
meaning.‘‖  Id.  We rejected this argument and held that the 
relevant provision was not ―‗ambiguous‘ merely because it 
does not expressly forbid every possible mechanism for 
functional – but not actual – satisfaction of statutory 
requirements.  Else, near every statute would be ‗ambiguous‘ 
and courts would have unfettered freedom to fashion creative 
mechanisms for satisfying the otherwise clear requirements 
mandated by Congress.‖  Id.   
 
The same holds true here.  Although we refrain from 
conjecturing that Congress‘ failure to specifically exclude a 
limitation is never sufficient by itself to create ambiguity, we 
conclude that, in this case, there is no statutory ―gap‖ that 
warrants the regulation.  See Pruidze, 632 F.3d at 240 (―We 
defer to an agency‘s efforts to fill statutory gaps, not to create 
them, and in this instance Congress left no gap to fill when it 
empowered the agency to consider all motions to reopen filed 
by an alien, not just those filed by aliens who remain in the 
United States up to the time of decision.‖); Rosillo-Puga, 580 
F.3d at 1163 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (―Under the 
[government‘s] approach, Chevron would require that 
15 
 
Congress expressly enumerate all that an agency cannot do 
before we may conclude that Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue.  The [government] would thus 
preclude customary expression of Congressional intent by the 
use of expansive and inclusive permissions such as those in § 
1229a(c)(6)(A) and (7)(A).‖) (internal quotation omitted).   
 
In addition to the plain and empowering language of 
the motion to reopen/reconsider provisions, the statute 
contains other compelling evidence of Congress‘ clear intent. 
 See United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 292 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(―At step one, we consider the text and structure of the statute 
in question.‖); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (―The meaning–or 
ambiguity–of  certain words or phrases may only become 
evident when placed in context.‖).   
 
The text of IIRIRA makes clear that Congress 
considered exceptions to or limitations on the right to file a 
motion to reopen/reconsider and did, in fact, include some 
limitations.  See Dada, 554 U.S. at 14 (―The Act, to be sure, 
limits in significant ways the availability of the motion to 
reopen.‖).  For example, as discussed above, in 1996 
Congress codified the regulation that imposed time and 
numerical restrictions.  Congress also codified the 
requirement that motions to reopen be based on new evidence. 
 See id. at 13-14.  As the Supreme Court has explained, 
―[w]hen Congress provides exceptions in a statute, it does not 
follow that courts have authority to create others.  The proper 
inference . . . is that Congress considered the issue of 
exceptions and, in the end, limited the statute to the ones set 
forth.‖  United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58 (2000).  
That inference is particularly strong when, as here, Congress 
specifically codified other regulatory limitations already in 
existence.  Congress did not codify the post-departure bar 
notwithstanding its long history.  Neither we nor the agency 
should be permitted to override Congress‘ considered 
judgment.
9
   
                                                 
9
 The government attempts to refute this analysis by 
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arguing that Congress was aware of the regulatory 
post-departure bar when it passed IIRIRA and failed to 
specifically revoke it.  Ergo, argues the government, 
Congress implicitly left its imprimatur on the 
regulation.  The government urges that we follow 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n. v. Schor, where 
the Supreme Court held that ―when Congress revisits a 
statute giving rise to a longstanding administrative 
interpretation without pertinent change, the 
congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency‘s 
interpretation is persuasive evidence that the 
interpretation is the one intended by Congress.‖  478 
U.S. 833, 846 (1986) (internal quotation omitted).  
 
This argument fails for two reasons.  First, in 
IIRIRA, Congress did not merely revisit a preexisting 
statute ―without [making] pertinent change[s].‖  As 
outlined, Congress made significant changes, codifying 
some regulations while ignoring others.  In such a 
situation, the Schor presumption lacks logical force, 
and Congress‘ nuanced consideration of which 
limitations and regulations to codify offers stronger 
evidence of Congress‘ intent than does Congress‘ 
alleged ―silence‖ with respect to the pre-existing post-
departure regulation.  As the Supreme Court has 
explained in rejecting this very argument in a similar 
context, ―[t]here is an obvious trump to the 
reenactment argument, however, in the rule that where 
the law is plain, subsequent reenactment does not 
constitute an adoption of the previous administrative 
construction.‖  Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 121 
(1994) (internal quotation and alteration omitted).   
 
Second, as noted by the Sixth Circuit in Pruidze, 
when Congress passed IIRIRA in 1996, ―there was no 
statutory provision [regarding motions to 
reopen/reconsider] to ‗revisit.‘  Until then, Congress 
had not spoken about motions to reopen[/reconsider] 
and thus it had said nothing that could give rise to an 
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Moreover, as evident from the statutory post-departure 
bar to judicial review that existed from 1961 until 1996, 
Congress knew how to codify post-departure limitations, but 
chose not to do so in 1996 when it significantly revised the 
immigration landscape.  IIRIRA § 306(b), 110 Stat. 3009-612 
(repealing 8 U.S.C. § 1105a).  See Jama v. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005) (―We do not 
lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted text 
requirements that it nonetheless intends to apply, and our 
reluctance is even greater when Congress has shown 
elsewhere in the same statute that it knows how to make such 
a requirement manifest.‖); Lin-Zheng, 557 F.3d at 156 (―Had 
Congress wished to extend [the statute], it could easily have 
[done so].‖).   
 
By repealing the post-departure bar to petitions for 
review before courts of appeals, IIRIRA gave aliens greater 
opportunity for review of deportation orders than they had 
previously.  This is consistent with IIRIRA‘s dual objectives 
―to expedite the physical removal of those aliens not entitled 
to admission to the United States, while at the same time 
increasing the accuracy of such determinations.‖  Coyt, 593 
F.3d at 906.  Congress could not have intended to undermine 
the second part of that goal—accuracy in determinations—by 
preventing aliens from filing motions for review with the BIA 
post-departure while simultaneously allowing aliens to seek 
even higher review with courts of appeals.  As the Supreme 
Court has noted, ―[a]mbiguity is a creature not of definitional 
possibilities but of statutory context.‖  Brown v. Gardner, 513 
                                                                                                             
agency interpretation that Congress could codify.  The 
Attorney General had adopted the departure bar in 
accordance with his then-unlimited authority over 
motions to reopen.‖  632 F.3d at 240.  Indeed, even the 
First Circuit, which upheld the post-departure bar to IJ 
reopening, noted that ―[t]he government‘s insistence 
that the Attorney General‘s interpretation was the one 
intended by Congress [based on Schor] may be 
overreaching.‖  Pena-Muriel, 489 F.3d at 443.  
Accordingly, the Schor presumption does not control. 
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U.S. 115, 118 (1994).  In this case, the context provided by 
Congress‘ repeal of the statutory post-departure bar to judicial 
review provides additional clarity regarding Congress‘ intent. 
  
An attempt to reconcile the post-departure bar with the 
time allowances for filing motions to reopen/reconsider 
reinforces the conclusion that Congress‘ intent is clear and 
that the regulation is invalid.  Congress provided each alien 
with the right to file one motion to reconsider within 30 days 
of the final order of deportation and one motion to reopen 
within 90 days.  The government is required to remove an 
alien from the United States within 90 days of the final order 
of deportation.  8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A).  As the Ninth 
Circuit has explained, ―[i]t would completely eviscerate the 
statutory right to reopen provided by Congress if the agency 
deems a motion to reopen constructively withdrawn whenever 
the government physically removes the [alien] while his 
motion is pending before the BIA.‖  Coyt, 593 F.3d at 907.  
See also Madrigal v. Holder, 572 F.3d 239, 244-45 (6th Cir. 
2009) (holding that the post-departure bar to appeals from the 
IJ to the BIA is inapplicable when the petitioner is forcibly 
removed during the pendency of his appeal).  As we held in 
Barrios v. Att’y Gen., 399 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2005), ―it is 
contrary to congressional intent to allow aliens to file motions 
to reopen but afford them no reasonable opportunity to 
receive a ruling on the merits.‖  Similarly, if aliens are 
permitted to file motions to reconsider but are then removed 
by the government before the time to file has expired, the 
right to have that motion adjudicated is abrogated.   
 
Another portion of the statute further cements the view 
that the post-departure bar regulation conflicts with the 
statutory right to file motions to reopen/reconsider.  In 2000, 
Congress enacted a special rule that exempted victims of 
domestic violence from the time limit on filing motions to 
reopen.  Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act 
of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, div. B, § 1506(c), 114 Stat. 
1464, 1528 (2000) (currently codified at 8 U.S.C. § 
1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)).  In 2005, Congress restricted the 
exception so that it only applied ―if the alien is physically 
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present in the United States at the time of filing the motion.‖  
Violence Against Women and Department of Justice 
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 
825(a)(2)(F), 119 Stat. 2960, 3063-64 (2006) (codified at 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(IV)).  There would be no need to 
provide such a requirement if motions to reopen could not be 
filed once the alien was outside of the country.   
 
Congress‘ requirement that domestic violence victims 
must remain in the United States to file their motions to 
reopen out of time stands in contrast to Congress‘ failure to 
provide a physical presence requirement for all aliens timely 
filing a motion to reopen/reconsider.  We turn to the canon of 
statutory construction that where Congress ―includes 
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate 
inclusion or exclusion.‖  Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 
16, 23 (1983) (internal quotation omitted).  If we uphold the 
regulation and find that physical presence in the United States 
is required before any motion to reopen/reconsider can be 
filed, we ―would render the physical presence requirement 
expressly written into [the domestic abuse subsection] mere 
surplusage.‖  William, 499 F.3d at 333.  And it ―is a cardinal 
principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon 
the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no 
clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or 
insignificant.‖  TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) 
(internal quotation omitted).    
 
The government attempts to downplay the significance 
of the physical presence requirement in the domestic violence 
exception in two ways.  First, it notes that the domestic 
violence physical presence language was added to the statute 
after IIRIRA was originally enacted.  This is of no moment.  
Irrespective of when the language was added, it is present 
now and we should not read it out of the statute.   
 
Second, the government claims that the domestic 
violence exception was enacted as part of larger legislation 
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relating to domestic violence and therefore does not speak to 
Congress‘ intent regarding the post-departure bar.  The 
Supreme Court has specifically noted that ―the meaning of 
one statute may be affected by other Acts, particularly where 
Congress has spoken subsequently and more specifically on 
the topic at hand.‖  Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 
U.S. at 133.  That is precisely what occurred here.  When 
Congress amended the domestic violence exception, it was 
undoubtedly aware of the whole text of the statute, saw that 
there was no physical presence requirement generally, and 
decided to include such a requirement as a prerequisite to 
harnessing the exception.   
 
In summary, the post-departure bar regulation conflicts 
with Congress‘ clear intent for several reasons.  First, the 
plain text of the statute provides each ―alien‖ with the right to 
file one motion to reopen and one motion to reconsider.  
Second, the importance and clarity of this right has been 
emphasized by the Supreme Court in Dada.  Third, Congress 
specifically considered and incorporated limitations on this 
right and chose not to include the post-departure bar, despite 
its prior existence in regulation.  Fourth, the post-departure 
bar would eviscerate the right to reopen/reconsider by 
allowing the government to forcibly remove the alien prior to 
the expiration of the time allowance.  Fifth, Congress 
included geographic limitations on the availability of the 
domestic violence exception, but included no such limitation 
generally.  Sixth, Congress specifically withdrew the statutory 
post-departure bar to judicial review in conformity with 
IIRIRA‘s purpose of speeding departure, but improving 
accuracy.  The regulatory post-departure bar to BIA motions 
to reopen/reconsider, if permitted, would undermine those 
dual objectives and conflict with the clear intent of Congress. 
  
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the decision 
of the BIA and remand for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.    
